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AUCTIONING CLASS COUNSEL IN SECURTIES LITIGATION 
 




 Private class action and shareholder derivative suits serve an important role in deterring 
securities fraud against innocent stockholders.1 Unfortunately, however, the current mechanisms 
for choosing the firm that will serve in the lucrative position as counsel for the plaintiff class 
have failed to prevent opportunistic firms from manipulating these legal actions to the detriment 
of shareholders and firm alike.  This paper assesses current models for securities fraud class 
action litigation and concludes that auctions of the right to serve as class counsel are the most 
effective means of promoting shareholder interests.  Auction proposals are not without problems, 
therefore, this paper further examines critiques of proposed and actual auction processes and 
concludes that courts should adopt the claims auction approach with safeguards that protect 
shareholders from underbidding the value of the claim.  
The thesis of the paper is to determine whether the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s 
(“PSLRA”)2 existing mechanisms create sufficient safeguards against the conduct of 
entrepreneurial attorney conduct or whether auctions are a more effective manner to address this 
problem.  The paper will evaluate the status quo, whether the enacting of the PSLRA has made a 
significant difference, and the auction system. 
 
                                                 
* Juris Doctor Candidate May 2004.  
1 Julia C. Kou, Closing the Loophole in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
253, 255 (1998). 
2 See id. 
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF CLASS 
ACTION SECURTIES LITIGATION 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
In theory, securities fraud litigation suits act as a mechanism by which shareholders can 
monitor managerial conduct.3 However, this laudable purpose becomes somewhat tarnished in 
light of the current environment of securities litigation. Many securities fraud litigation suits are 
so-called “strike suits” which are discovered by entrepreneurial attorneys who are less concerned 
with compensating defrauded stockholders than they are with lining their own pockets.4  “Private 
lawyers, seeking private gain, have become self-employed guardians of the public interest, 
searching for causes of action and pursuing them to recovery.”5 These class actions suits are big 
business.  Between January 1991 and May 1999 there were approximately 733 federal class 
action securities cases filed in which the average fee award was approximately 30.12 percent of 
the settlement amount.6 The total amount of settlements during this period as a result of those 
actions was $6.1 billion, with approximately $1.837 billion being paid to class counsel.7 Many 
commentators argue that such fee awards are not consistent with market standards. 
                                                 
3 Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 423, 27 (1993). 
4 See Kou, supra note 1 at 254 (Defines strike suits as suits that are initiated by an attorney “without reasonable 
grounds to believe [the case] has merit, or having initiated an action reasonably believing it was meritorious, 
maintains the action even after discovery makes clear the action lacks merit.”). 
5 Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 
REV. LITIG. 25, 26 (2002)(The author argues that lawyers who have committed themselves to detecting wrongdoing 
have significantly contributed to the deterrence of securities fraud by using private resources. Thus, these attorneys 
play a positive and pivotal role).  
6 Joseph A. Grundfest, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation:  A Proposal for Addressing a 
Problem That Has No Perfect Solution, June 1, 2001 (Testimony before the 3d Cir. Task Force on Selection of Class 
Counsel).  
7 See id. 
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This process is most effectively demonstrated by a paradigm example.8 In the 
stereotypical securities fraud strike suit prior to the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, an attorney or a firm devotes some time in researching potential securities fraud 
cases.  Noting a significant price drop in a stock, the attorney locates shareholders of the 
corporation’s stock and approaches them regarding a possible securities fraud action.  The 
shareholders are usually individuals who, while owning some of the corporation’s stock, do not 
face devastating losses.  Even though these individual shareholders bear little financial risk 
themselves, they agree to participate in the hope of receiving a settlement.  Thus, the attorney has 
located his or her “key to the courthouse door” with little worry that the plaintiffs will monitor, 
evaluate, or question his or her methods.  
Alleging that the defendants have made “material misrepresentations” that induced the 
plaintiffs to purchase stock, the attorney races to court and files a lawsuit.  Defendants allege that 
the statements they made were accurate and they reasonably believed they would meet their 
growth projections based on the information they possessed at the time.  It is far from clear that 
the plaintiffs could win this case, however, in light of the costs that a lengthy trial would impose 
upon the corporation, the corporation opts to settle.  Thus, after some discovery, the attorneys on 
both sides agree to settle the case, with the attorneys for the plaintiffs receiving 25-30%, which is 
considered the standard benchmark rate, of the total settlement value.  Both sides have a 
substantial interest in gaining the court’s approval of the settlement, thus there is no serious 
possibility that the settlement award will be challenged by either attorney.  Nor will the plaintiffs 
in the case be in a position to question the settlement, because they are likely to be fairly 
removed from the litigation and the negotiations. 
                                                 
8 This example is loosely based on the facts of In re Warner Communications Securities Litig, 618 F. Supp 735 
(1985).  
 4
In this situation, plaintiffs are solicited by the attorney,9 and only “serve as the attorney’s 
‘key to the courthouse door’ and little else.”10  The way in which securities fraud class action 
suits are maintained created an environment where self-interested behavior on the part of 
attorneys flourished, often at the expense of the best interests of the clients the lawyers are 
purportedly representing.11  Reality is a “dim reflection” of the model in which the ethical duty 
of an attorney to promote his or her clients’ best interests to the furthest extent permissible.12 
Under the current system the attorney, not the plaintiff, controls every important aspect and 
decision made in the case.13  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys typically do not rely on named plaintiffs for vital testimony, 
do not bargain with named plaintiffs over the fees they will be paid, and do not 
require named plaintiffs’ approval of the terms on which they propose to settle 
class actions.  The conflicts of interest inherent in class actions have led critics to 
claim that class action attorneys are more interested in maximizing their fee when 
settling a case than in attaining a fair award for class members.14 
 
The Private Securities Litigation Act (“PSLRA”) was designed and enacted to prevent 
such entrepreneurial strike suits against corporations.15  The PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision 
requires the shareholder with the most financial stake in the litigation to serve as lead plaintiff.16  
The rationale for this is that a plaintiff who truly has a significant financial stake will more 
assertively and effectively monitor the conduct of the attorneys and will more strenuously object 
to an inappropriate settlement agreement.   
 
                                                 
9 Note that direct client solicitation violates most states’ rules of professional conduct governing the behavior of 
lawyers.   
10 Thomas & Hansen, supra note 2, at 459. 
11 See id.   
12 See id.  at 433-34. 
13 See id. at 434.  
14 See Kendra S. Langlois, Putting the Plaintiff Class’ Needs in the Lead:  Reforming Class Action Litigation by 
Extending the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 WM. and MARY L. REV. 
855, 856-57 (2002). 
15 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 77z-1 to 78u-5 (1994 & Supp;. 1996). 
16 See id. 
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B. COMPENSATION—A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATUS QUO 
There are two generally accepted methods of attorney compensation in class actions, as well 
as in normal (i.e., single plaintiff) litigation.  These include the lodestar method and the 
percentage-of-recovery method.  Each method has its various strengths and weaknesses and 
creates “incentives” problems. Incentives problems are defined as situations where the agent (in 
this case the attorney) has incentive to act in a manner that is beneficial to the agent, but not in 
the best interest of the principal (in this case the plaintiff class).   
The lodestar method requires the judge to take a reasonable number of hours expended by the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and multiply it by a reasonable rate.17 This approach was first seen in the 
1973 case Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp.18 The hourly rate may vary according to the attorney’s experience, reputation, 
practice, and qualifications or by the nature of the services provided.19 The Fifth Circuit in 
Johnson v Georgia Highway Express, Inc.  adapted a twelve-factor scale which it uses to 
evaluate reasonable attorneys’ fees.20 
Although on paper the lodestar calculation method appears to offer a meaningful way in 
which to set attorneys’ fees it has been soundly criticized.  The factors themselves are at least 
partially redundant and provide “no analytical framework for their application.”21 Whether the 
factors are to be weighed equally, or if the relative weight of each factor should vary according 
                                                 
17 Court Awarded Attorney Fees Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985) 
18 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). 
19 See id. at 168. 
20 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)(the twelve elements are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of 
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed 
or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the 
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; 
(11) the nature and the length of the professional relationship with the client; (12) awards in similar cases). 
21 See Smith Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees:  What is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 286-87 
(1977)(footnotes omitted). 
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to the circumstances of the particular litigation is unclear.22  However, the lack of analytical 
weight given to each factor pales in comparison with the potential problems that the lodestar 
method creates in terms of attorney incentives.  The most obvious problem with the lodestar 
method is that it offers no motivation to control hours and costs.23  An Attorney can be 
“reasonably sure” of having most of his or her costs paid as long as the fees are less than any 
settlement.24  These attorneys actually have an incentive to engage in “make-work” or otherwise 
increase their hours on a case to the extent that they believe the court will still approve the fee 
request.25 The excessive charges which this behavior creates are obviously contrary to the 
interests of the class.26  Inquiries by the court into the reasonableness of the fees, or any 
investigative attempt by the court are unlikely to yield results.27  The judiciary lacks the time and 
the resources to engage in a truly meaningful investigation of proposed attorneys’ fees.  
Furthermore, inquiries into the fees could make attorneys refuse certain types of litigation.28  
Secondly, the lodestar method may create an incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle on the 
eve of the trial for a lesser amount than what could be achieved at a trial in order to avoid the 
expense and time of a full-blown trial.29 Plaintiffs’ attorneys have completed most of the work 
                                                 
22 See id; see also, Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc): 
Simply to articulate those twelve factors…does not itself conjure up a reasonable dollar figure in 
the mind of a district court judge.  A formula is necessary to translate the relevant factors into 
terms of dollars and cents.  This is particularly true because the twelve factors overlap 
considerably.  For example, largely subsumed under the factor “time and labor required” is an 
assessment of the “difficulty of the questions.”  That is so because the more difficult the problem, 
the longer it will take to adequately resolve it.  
23 See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 2 at 431 (1993). 
24 See id. 
25 See Kou, supra note 1at 263 (1998).  
26 See id. 
27 See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 2, at 431. 
28 See id. at 431-32, the author hypothesizes that: 
judicial supervision could worsen the situation by making certain classes of activities especially 
prone to judicial review and therefore risky to undertake, from the point of view of the attorney.  
Consequently, there would be a tendency to avoid these activities even in cases where they would 
benefit the plaintiffs.  
29 See Kou, supra note 1, at 263. 
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that their fee is likely to be based upon prior to trial, therefore, they have little incentive to 
actually prosecute the case fully and completely.30 Plaintiffs’ attorneys who actually do go to 
trial risk losing at trial and recovering nothing.  Most attorneys in this situation would obviously 
opt for the sure settlement amount, rather than an uncertain amount awarded by a jury, even if 
this is not necessarily in the best interests of the class.31  
The second usual method of attorney compensation is the percentage method.  Although 
there are different methods of calculating percentage compensation, all percentage compensation 
methods allocate a percentage of the plaintiff’s recovery to the attorney.  In contrast to the 
lodestar method, percentage compensation creates incentives for attorneys to control legal costs.  
But that same incentive structure also suffers from several problems of perverse incentives.32  
First, percentage compensation provides incentives to agree to premature settlements.33 This is 
because “payments to the attorney will increase with additional effort only if that additional 
effort results in a higher settlement.”34  The attorney spending additional resources to litigate a 
case with the hope of increasing the settlement, will only receive a fraction of the ultimate 
settlement increase.35  Thus, the attorney will generally not expend the maximum effort 
necessary to increase the settlement amount.36   
Other problems with percentage-based compensation depend upon the specific method 
chosen. Under a duration-based fee structure, which can be driven by the calendar or the stage of 
                                                 
30 See id. at 263-64. 
31 See id; see also, Analisa Valle, To the Lowest Bidder?  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and 
Auctioning the Role of Lead Counsel, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 359, 382-83(2003)(Discussing the drawbacks of the 
lodestar and benchmark methods.  The lodestar method creates incentives to spend exhaustive hours on simple cases 
to maximize reportable hours.  The benchmark system allows the judge to look at current established practices, 
however, the judge rarely evaluates whether that benchmark is appropriate given the complexity of the current 
litigation). 
32 See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 2, at 432.  
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id; see also Kou supra note 2, at 265(“At the end of the day, we may have too many weak cases filed and too 
many good cases settled out too cheaply.”) 
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litigation, the proposed fee increases as the case moves closer to actual litigation.  The inherent 
problem with this structure is that most litigation is controlled by plaintiffs’ counsel.37 Caps on 
percentages, which allow the law firm to receive a maximum amount but no more, discourage 
law firms from vigorously pursuing the case after that amount has been achieved.   
In spite of these flaws with both the lodestar and percentage method of attorney 
compensation, the status quo has its supporters. Proponents of the status quo argue that FRCP 23 
effectively addresses this problem. Initially the drafters of the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 he 
intended to give courts the power and ability to supervise class counsel in the same way that they 
supervise other types of litigation.38 Under Rule 23 courts were granted wide latitude in 
managing class action suits such as the ability to choose counsel, set fees, and approve 
settlements.39 Such safeguards purportedly ensure that the plaintiff class is not taken advantage 
of in its absence.40   
But courts have largely failed in this supervisory function.41 First, courts are “constrained by 
the institutional requirements of neutrality and passivity set by the adversary system.”42  Second, 
courts rely on an adversarial process to ensure that all issues are fully litigated and argued on the 
merits.  In a class action settlement, attorneys for both sides are often anxious to have the matter 
settled, and true adversity between the parties is rare.43 Thus, the adversarial system fails to 
provide sufficient information to assist the court n effective policing of settlement agreements. 
Counsel for both sides have the same goal—settle the case quickly.   
                                                 
37 See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Bock: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 650, 690 (2002). 
38 Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 
REV. LITIG. 25, 44 (2002). 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. at 45. 
43 See id. 
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C. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT—THE “LEAD PLAINTIFF” PROVISION 
 
In 1995 Congress tried to resolve some of the issues that arise from various fee arrangements 
and as a result of the systemic problems that arise due to the very nature of our adversarial 
nature.  Congress’ answer was the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PSLRA”).44 Congress enacted the PSLRA to assist courts in choosing both the lead plaintiff 
and the lead counsel with an eye toward reducing some of the perceived abuses by 
entrepreneurial attorneys that class action litigation in securities perpetuates:   
Congress has been prompted by significant evidence of abuse in private securities 
lawsuits to enact reforms to protect investors and maintain confidence in our 
capital markets.  The House and Senate Committees heard evidence that abusive 
practices committed in private securities litigation include…the routine filing of 
lawsuits against issuers…whenever there is a significant change in an issuer’s 
stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with 
only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible 
cause of action…[and] the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so 
burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle.45 
 
The PSLRA establishes a number of important checks against the perverse incentives 
favoring settlement of securities actions regardless of the merits or the impact upon 
shareholders.46 First, the PSLRA requires publication of notice of the lawsuit to allow other 
potential class members the opportunity to file a motion to be considered as lead plaintiff.47 
Second, the court must appoint the “most adequate” (i.e., the “lead”) plaintiff from the purported 
class responding to the lawsuit within 90 days of this publication.48 The lead plaintiff is one who 
the court determines to be the most capable of adequately representing the interests of class 
                                                 
44 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 77z-1 to 78u-5 (1994 & Supp;. 1996)).  
45 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995). 
46 See id. 
47 See 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). 
48 See id. 
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members.49 In determining which plaintiff is the most appropriate to represent the class in the 
lead plaintiff capacity, the court must consider the factors listed in FRCP 23.50 Additionally, the 
plaintiff seeking to serve as the lead plaintiff must provide a sworn, signed certification that 
demonstrates that the plaintiff complies with the additional requirements of the PSLRA.51  The 
factors required by the PSLRA include that the plaintiff:52  
• Has reviewed the complaint and authorized its filing 
• Did not purchase the security at the direction of counsel in order to participate in the 
litigation 
• Is willing to serve as a representative party on behalf of the class 
• Is willing to provide testimony at deposition and at trial, if a trial proves necessary 
• Provide information regarding any other litigation under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a) et. seq. 
that the plaintiff sought to be named lead plaintiff in.53 
The most important of these factors is the financial interest that the person or group of 
persons has in the litigation.54 The presumption is that the investor with the largest interest in the 
case is the most appropriate lead plaintiff.55 Once the most appropriate lead plaintiff is selected, 
that entity or person has the authority to select and retain lead counsel, subject to the approval of 
the court.56 
                                                 
49 See id. 
50 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 states that the court will evaluate several factors including the interest of the members of the 
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; the extent and nature of any litigation 
already commenced; the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum; the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. 
51 See 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(2) 
52 See id. 
53 See 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(2)(ii)-(vi).  
54 See 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(bb) (which states that the most adequate plaintiff in any securities action 
covered by this title will be the one that “in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the 
relief sought by the class….”) 
55 See Fisch, supra note 37 at 702 (2002).  
56 See id.  See also, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
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The legislative history indicates Congress’ intent for the lead plaintiff provisions of the 
PSLRA was to encourage involvement in securities class actions by institutional investors such 
as investment banks, mutual funds, and state and union pension funds.57 Congress assumed that 
institutional investors tend to be more sophisticated than the average investor in securities.58 
Congress believed that sophisticated institutional investors would be better able to monitor the 
behavior of their attorneys at all stages of the litigation.59  Congress rationalized that institutional 
investors have the financial resources that would enable them to commit knowledgeable staff to 
monitor the process.60 Additionally, since these investors typically have more at stake financially 
than do the average investor, they should have an incentive to “develop the necessary expertise” 
to ensure that the plaintiffs’ attorneys are acting as “faithful champions for the plaintiff class.”61  
In this respect, the PSLRA “was expected to revolutionize securities fraud class actions by 
encouraging greater participation by the investor clients, who traditionally were prevented by 
counsel from exercising any decisions in the class action suit.”62 The PSLRA in effect took the 
emphasis off of choosing lead plaintiffs’ counsel and placed it squarely on choosing the lead 
plaintiff.63   
Critics of the PSLRA assert that the Act has failed in its goals of decreasing entrepreneurial 
behavior by attorneys and increasing the benefit of security litigation to the plaintiff class. These 
critics cite several reasons for this assertion. First, they argue that the PSLRA has failed to 
                                                 
57 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (the PSLRA is “intended to increase the likelihood that parties with 
significant holdings in issuers, whose interests are more strongly aligned with the class of shareholders, will 
participate in the litigation and exercise control over the selection and actions of plaintiff’s counsel”). 
58 See id. 
59 See id.  See also, Charles H. Gray, An Economic Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: 
Auctions as an Efficient Alternative to Judicial Intervention, 44 WM. and MARY L. REV. 829, 874-75 (2002).  
60 See Gray, supra note 59, at 875-76. 
61 See id. at 875 quoting Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2065 (1995).  
62 See Ashe P. Puri, And the Winner Is…Interpreting the Lead Plaintiff and the Lead Counsel Provisions of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 VILL. L. REV. 491, 493 (2002).  
63 See id. 
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achieve its goal of increasing institutional investor involvement in securities fraud cases and 
decreasing opportunistic behavior by attorneys.64  For numerous reasons, institutional investors 
have failed to step up to the plate, the most commonly cited of which is the large costs that they 
would incur if they were appointed lead plaintiff.65 “Since the PSLRA has expressly limited the 
recovery of lead plaintiffs to reasonable costs and expenses directly relating to the representation 
of the class, institutional investors are better off not monitoring [in the position of lead 
plaintiff].”66Another often-cited reason is that institutions may be unwilling to open sensitive 
records for review by counsel on both sides of the table, which may become necessary if the 
institution assumes the role of lead plaintiff.67  Additionally, institutions fear that becoming a 
lead plaintiff may have its own liability risks with respect to other class members.68 Citing the 
aforementioned reasons, critics argue that auctions of securities class action litigation would 
better address the problems that seem endemic in this type of litigation.  
 
II. AUCTIONS—A DIFFERENT ROUTE 
Critics of the PSLRA contend that the Act is fails to protect the interests of shareholders.  
The PSLRA, they argue, does not do enough to attract qualified lead plaintiffs, thus, the status 
quo has been maintained with “strike suits” continuing unabated and with lawyers continuing to 
profit handsomely.  These critics contend that a more effective way to eliminate these frivolous 
suits is to auction the right to serve as lead plaintiff’s counsel to the law firm that presents the 
most cost-effective bid for the right to represent the plaintiffs.  
                                                 
64 See Klement, supra note 4 at 58-59 (2002)(The author proposes a system whereby a monitor who is responsible 
for the litigation is appointed by the court). 
65 See id. at 58 (“Having to bear these costs while enjoying only their share of the accrued benefit, institutional 
investors prefer to monitor from the outside as unnamed class members rather than represent the class.”). 
66 See Klement, supra note 4, at 59. See also, 15 U.S.C. 77z-1(a)(4)(1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
67 See Klement, supra note 4, at 59.  
68 See id. at 58-59. 
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A. WHY AUCTIONS BETTER SERVE THE PLAINTIFF CLASS 
 
Advocates of auctions contend that competitive bidding could curtail abuses inherent in 
the class action process by giving control of the litigation back to the plaintiff class.69 Auction 
proponents believe that the PSLRA failed to achieve its goals of reducing entrepreneurial 
behavior on the part of attorneys with its strategy of appointing a lead plaintiff because it fails to 
give courts any criteria in evaluating the lead plaintiff’s choice of lead counsel. 70 Because the 
PSLRA failed to give courts any guidance, courts are reluctant to reject the plaintiff’s selection 
and often fail to evaluate meaningfully plaintiff’s choice at all.71 Auctions attempt to mimic what 
the lead plaintiff’s decision would be if there were truly an open, vigorous, and competitive 
market for class action attorneys.72  Although fewer than fifteen cases have employed auction 
procedures, the percentage fees obtained by counsel in these cases have been substantially lower 
than in securities fraud cases where traditional methods of payment have been used.  For 
example, in In re Network Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation73 the attorneys received just 
seven percent of the $30 million settlement.  The highest settlement award using an auction 
occurred in In re Wells Fargo Securities Litigation74 where the plaintiff’s attorney received 21.2 
percent of the $13.5 million settlement. Thus, even at the high end, the awards generated by 
auctions are significantly lower than the current average of approximately 25 to 30 percent.   
                                                 
69 See Valle, supra note 31 at 359 (excessive attorney fees is a common criticism of the class action process).  
70 See id. at 368. 
71 See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform:  Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 533 (1997). 
72 See In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566,572 (7th Cir. 1992)(“The object is to simulate the 
market where a direct market determination is infeasible.  It is infeasible in a class action because no member of the 
class has a sufficient stake to drive hard—or any—bargain with the lawyer.  So the judge has to step in and play 
surrogate client.”).  
73 No. C-99-01729 WHA (Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action, Mar. 14, 2001, N.D. Cal.). 
74 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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 Auction supporters believe that the PSLRA has failed to entice institutional investors who 
are willing to make the substantial time, resources, and financial commitment necessary to 
monitor entrepreneurial behavior of firms.75  Without institutional investors willing to expend 
this substantial effort, the system will remain relatively unchecked, and the problems which 
originally lead Congress to draft the PSLRA will continue unabated.76 Auction proponents cite to 
a number of cases where judges have successfully auctioned the lead counsel postion.77  
Additionally, auctions allow smaller firms to bid in this process which lessens the near monopoly 
that currently exists in such class action suits,78 and the competitive nature of auctions drives fees 
downward, thereby increasing the distribution of the damage award actually paid to the plaintiff 
class.79 Furthermore, auction proponents posit that the traditional adverse relationship between 
the parties simply does not exist in class action settlement proposals.80   
 
B. LEAD PLAINTIFF AUCTIONS VERSUS CLAIMS AUCTIONS 
There are two types of auctions.  The first type involves auctioning off the position of the 
lead plaintiff (“Lead Counsel Auctions”).  This auction method has been used in several cases.81  
The second type is both more controversial and untried.  It involves auctioning off the entire 
claim to a firm (“Claim Auctions”).82  Once the winning bid is selected, the money offered is 
                                                 
75 Joseph A. Grundfest, More Questions than Answers and a Friendly Wager, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 821, 823 (2001) 
(The author asserts that fewer than ten percent of plaintiffs, even institutional plaintiffs, contact more than one law 
firm.  Thus, little if any, true fee negotiations take place under the current system).  
76  See id. 
77 See id. (The author details fee percentages that fall far below the “benchmark” of 25%-33% and fall in the range 
of 7-14%, with one exception which was granted 21%). 
78 See Puri, supra note 62 at 513; see also, Thomas & Hansen, supra note 2 at (Thomas and Hansen describe the 
current system of securities fraud class action as “anti-competitive” where a “small number of firms appear in nearly 
every case and effectively dominate the litigation.”). 
79 See id. 
80 See Langlois, supra note 13 at 864-65.  
81 See In re Oracle Sec. Litig, 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 223 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994); see also infra note 91 for a listing of other such cases.  
82 See Thomas & Hansen supra note 2. (The authors have proposed this system in an effort to curtail some of the 
inherent problems of auctioning of lead counsel positions such as under- or overbidding for a claim).  
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paid directly to the plaintiff class, which receives an immediate monetary settlement.83  The 
lawyers then litigate the class action, retaining whatever monetary award is achieved.84 If the 
award is more than the payment for the auction, less expenses, then the firm makes a “profit” on 
the litigation.  
 
1. Lead Plaintiffs’ Counsel Auctions 
Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, auctions were used to address the systemic 
problems that are inherent within securities class action litigation. The first case in American 
jurisprudence to use the lead plaintiff auction method was In re Oracle Securities Litigation.85  
Oracle began when the corporation announced that it would not meet its earning projections for 
the first quarter of 1990.86 Immediately after this announcement, the stock price fell 
dramatically.87 A class action suit ensued and following a contentious meeting between firms 
vying for the position of plaintiffs’ counsel,  Judge Vaughn R. Walker ordered the various 
competing firms to submit bids based on their predictions of the litigation budget.88 Judge 
Walker believed that the competitive-bidding process “most closely approximates the way class 
members themselves would make these decisions and should result in selection of the most 
appropriately qualified counsel at the best available price.”89 The court requested bids from those 
firms which were interested in representing the plaintiff class.90  
                                                 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
86 See id. at 689. 
87 See id. at 690. 
88 Id. at 690 (The opinion describes the meeting of the competing counsel in a humorous manner, describing a 
meeting in which two of the firms disparaged each other and further describes that these two firms actually filed a  
proposal to jointly represent the plaintiff class). 
89 Id.  
90 See id. at 697; see also, 132 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1990)(Of the 29 firms which initially expressed an 
interest in representing the plaintiff class, only four actually submitted a bid.). 
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Since that case, several courts have experimented with lead plaintiff auctions within the 
context of securities fraud litigation.91 The general procedure is simple.  Through a competitive 
bidding process, counseling wishing to be named lead plaintiffs’ counsel submit a proposal to the 
court by a given deadline.92 The bid requirements proposed by the court in In re Wells Fargo 
Security Litigation are typical.93 The Court required competing counsel to disclose the following 
information: (1) The firm’s experience, and that of the individual attorneys; (2) the firm’s 
qualifications, including its willingness to post a “completion bond or other security for the 
faithful completion of its services to the class;” (3) the firm’s malpractice insurance coverage; (4) 
the percentage of any recovery the firm would charge in the event of recovery; and (5) other 
terms of the proposed fee arrangement.94 Other factors considered by courts included the firm’s 
reputational capital, for example it’s reputation as a firm that is a “tough bargainer,” and the 
firm’s fit with the lead plaintiff.95 Once the information is obtained from the competing firms, 
the court usually determines the most qualified bidder and awards that firm the opportunity to 
represent the class.96  
2. Claims Auctions 
A proposed but untried variation of the auction procedure is an auction of the entire claim. 
Under a claim auction, legal counsel would bid to “purchase” the claim from the plaintiff class. 
                                                 
91 See In re Oracle Securities Litig, 132 F.R.D. (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Oracle Securities Litig, 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991); In re Cendant Corp, 260 F.3d 183 (3rd Cir. 2001); In re Comdisco Se. Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. 
Ill. 2001); In re Bank One S’holders Class Actions, 96 F.Supp. 2d 780, 784-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000); In re Commtouch 
Software Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 01-C-00719 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In re Network Assocs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 
1017, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 587-88 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Cal. 
Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 270-71 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable 
Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1999).  
92 See Puri supra note 74, at 511. 
93 156 F.R.D. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
94 See id. at 228-29. 
95 See Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select Lead Counsel, 80 Wash. U.L.Q. 
889, 892 (2002)(The author argues that the fit of the firm with the plaintiff is often undervalued by courts to the 
determent of the entire plaintiff class.). 
96 See Puri, supra note 62 at 511. 
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Theoretically, ownership of the claim would wipe out all of the attorney incentives in traditional 
fee arrangements, as well as answer most of the criticisms of those opposed to the auction of lead 
plaintiffs’ counsel position.  According to Macey and Miller, the leading proponents of claims 
auctions,97 the judge should determine initially whether an auction is appropriate on a case-by-
case basis.98  This determination would require analysis of several factors including: 
• whether the case was large-scale, small claim litigation  
• how many complaints had been filed 
• how the claims in the case are defined; and  
• whether any other factors exist that would suggest that an auction is inappropriate.99 
Once the judge determined that an auction was appropriate he or she defines the claim being 
sold, posts notice to ensure that interested bidders would participate, and selects a bidding 
method for the auction.100 Discovery is allowed to the extent that would enable interested bidders 
to investigate the claim.101 One of the more controversial aspects of the model proposed by 
Macey and Miller is that the defendant is also allowed to bid on the claim.102 
Once the court determines the winning bid and awards the claim to that bidder, the bidder 
pays the amount of the claim to the court.103 The court then deducts all appropriate expenses, 
including compensation for the attorneys who first filed the suit.104 The court next distributes the 
net proceeds to the plaintiff class.105  The plaintiff class is then all but completely removed from 
                                                 
97 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation:  Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.CHI. L. REV. 1, 97-105 (1991)(provides a 
global description of the proposed mechanics for conducting claims auctions).  
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 106 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 107. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
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the litigation, being compensated quickly and efficiently for their respective injuries.  The 
winning bidder then proceeds to litigate the case in whatever manner they deem appropriate, 
unless the winning bidder is the defendant.  In the event that the defendant is the highest bidder 
in the auction, the defendant would petition the court for a dismissal with prejudice once the 
injured plaintiffs have been compensated with the bid money.106  
 
3. Benefits of Claims Auctions 
The proponents of this type of auction argue that “auctioning ownership and control of the 
lawsuit in one party” minimizes agency costs and eliminates attorney incentives that harm 
plaintiffs.107  Instead of incentives to settle too early for too little, the ownership component 
gives the winning bidder incentives to litigate aggressively and to expend the appropriate effort 
to maximize the recovery.108 Additionally, the lack of adversity between the parties inherent in 
most settlement actions is virtually eliminated.109  Another benefit is that the court would not 
have to spend its time or resources evaluating proposed settlement agreements between the 
defendant and the plaintiff class.110  
 
4. Pitfalls of Claims Auctions 
Auctions of this sort are not without shortcomings.  One of the most often cited criticisms 
include whether the judge would be knowledgeable enough about the entire process to properly 
conduct the auction.111 Specifically, critics of the claims auction question whether the judge 
                                                 
106 See id. at 108. 
107 See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 2, at 435.   
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. at 435. 
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would be capable of defining the scope of the claim to be auctioned, and whether the claim 
would be appropriate for an auction.112  
Other commonly cited criticisms of claims auctions include the potential for collusion among 
bidders to devalue the claim, the possibility of too few or too many bidders, whether the bidders 
could arrange appropriate financing, the difficulty of appropriately valuing the claim, and the 
uncertainty of whether the individual members of the plaintiff class would cooperate once they 
had been compensated for their injuries.113  
Valuation of the securities fraud claim seems to be a relatively objective process measured by 
the decrease in stock value as a result of the alleged fraud compared to mass tort litigation, where 
the value of the individual claims may be hotly disputed and contingent upon many subjective 
factors.  Thus, it appears that claims auctions could be more easily implemented in securities 
fraud class actions than in other areas of the law because they often lack a significant subjective 
component.114 
The problem of quantity of bidders could be a factor that decreases the effectiveness of the 
bidding process of this type of auction.115 However, this factor could be greatly diminished, if 
not completely eliminated if competing firms did not know the identity of other law firms 
involved in the process, or the number of other bidders in the process.116 In a situation where all 
participants are blind, the bids submitted by each participant are not influenced by other 
participants in the process.117 
 
                                                 
112 See id. 
113 See id. at 435-36. 
114 See Fisch, supra note 37 (critics contend that calculation of damages in securities litigation is really not as 
objective as it appears and involves subjection valuation testimony by experts).  
115 See Gray, supra note 59 at 842.  
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
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III. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE AUCTION PROCESS ITSELF 
Critics of auctions maintain that they are fundamentally flawed.118  These critics maintain 
that the flaws exist regardless of the type of auction utilized. The most common criticisms of 
auctions include that:  
• they appear to be more concerned with the bottom-line price as opposed to the 
quality of the firm,119  
 
• there is no way to truly ascertain whether auctions are effective,120  
• auctions reduce counsels’ incentives to assertively litigate on behalf of their 
clients,121 and  
 
• judges may not be the an appropriate choice to be auctioneers.122  
Furthermore, critics of auctions posit that the PSLRA, with its lead plaintiff requirements, will 
eventually increase sophisticated investors’ involvement in securities fraud litigation to an 
acceptable level.123  
The main criticisms of auction methodology can be broken down into four categories:  
(1) Auctions deter experienced investors from securities litigation; (2) the process of bidding is 
inconsistent with the PSLRA; (3) the inappropriateness of having a judge assume the role of 
auctioneer; (4) acceptance of settlement offers that are too low.  
 
A. AUCTIONS DETER EXPERIENCED INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS FROM PARTICIPATING 
                                                 
118 See William J. Friedman, Litigation in a Free Society:  The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select Lead 
Counsel, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 889, 892 (2002)( Competitive bidding reduces the expected recovery of the plaintiff 
class in two ways.  First, the bidding process focuses almost exclusively on the price, and does not focus on the 
qualitative differences between firms.  Second, the bidding process results in less incentive for attorneys to 
aggressively advocate for their clients).    
119 See id.  
120 See id. 
121 See Fisch supra note 37 at 702-03. 
122 See id. 
123 See 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i)(defines lead plaintiff as the plaintiff with the most financial stake in the 
litigation).  
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Those who favor allowing the lead plaintiff to choose the lead position counsel argue that 
“the greatest strength of the PSLRA…is its provision allowing these investors to appoint lead 
counsel.124 This provision is important because it gives institutional investors, those whom 
Congress most wanted to encourage to participate in this type of litigation, the ability to select 
counsel with whom they are comfortable and familiar.125  Stripping this decision-making ability 
from institutional investors and arranging “shotgun marriages” of the plaintiff with counsel not 
of their choosing discourages these entities from participating.126 The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) argued in an amicus brief that the court should not ordinarily interfere with 
the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel.127 Rather, courts should trust the judgment of a lead 
plaintiff “who possesses the qualities and acts in the manner contemplated by Congress” because 
“failing to do so could enhance counsel’s control of the litigation, which is contrary to Congress’ 
intent” and could also “deprive institutional investors of a core reason for serving as lead 
plaintiff.”128 Furthermore, there are a number of factors of securities fraud class actions that 
make the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA the most appropriate means of choosing 
auctions.  These factors include: 
(1) homogeneous damages that can be fairly and objectively allocated in a 
settlement agreement, (2) the probability of repeat performances by institutional 
investors as lead plaintiffs, thereby increasing their influence over lead counsel, 
and (3) an objective factor, namely, the size of the investor’s stake, to use in 
easily determining the most adequate lead plaintiff in terms of both sophistication 
and financial resources.129   
 
                                                 
124 See Langlois supra note 13, at 878. 
125 See id. at 878-79. 
126 See id. at 879. 
127 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission at 23, Moore v. Network Assocs., Inc., (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) (No. 00-70006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigatoin/briefs.netwkbr2.html (last visited January 28, 
2004). 
128 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 109 F.Supp. 2d 
285 (D.N.J. 2000) (Nos. 00-2769, 00-3653), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/cendnt.htm (last 
visited January 28, 2004). 
129 See Langlois, supra note 13, at 904. 
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B. BIDDING IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PSLRA 
Critics of auctions believe that auctions are directly contradictory to the statutory clear 
language of the PSLRA.  The Act states that the person or group of persons who are selected by 
the court to serve as lead plaintiff shall select counsel.130 The legislative history of the PSLRA 
indicates that “judicial discretion in approving the selection of counsel should be guided by 
‘existing law.’”131 Courts should evaluate the experience, competence, and resources of the firm 
attempting to represent the plaintiff class and should “withhold approval only when necessary to 
protect the interests of the plaintiff class.”132  These critics argue that auctions are not part of the 
“existing law” that the authors of the Act contemplated.133 According to those who believe that 
the PSLRA does not allow for competitive bidding, the role of the courts is simple and finite:  
judges must ensure only that the counsel selected by the lead plaintiff is adequate, using already 
existing mechanisms to make that determination.134  
Several courts have considered and rejected bidding as inconsistent with the requirements 
and objectives of the PSLRA.135 In In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig136 the Third Circuit 
invalidated the trial court’s lead counsel auction because it concluded that the auction in that case 
was inappropriate.137 The appellate court did not expressly prohibit auctions, but expressed that 
auctions were generally inconsistent with the statutory scheme of the PSLRA.138 The Third 
Circuit felt that the correct question to ask was “not whether another movant might do a better 
                                                 
130 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 35 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 734 (emphasis added). 
131 See id.   
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 See Id. at 383-84. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (The author argues that the PSLRA simply mirrors the factors listed 
in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23) 
135 See Fred B. Burnside, “Go Pick a Client”—And Other Tales of Woe Resulting from the Selection of Class 
Counsel by Court-Ordered Competitive Bidding, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 363, 383-390 (2003) (The author 
argues that Rule 23 guides the court in determining whether the attorney selected by lead counsel is adequate and 
that the PSLRA merely codifies existing Rule 23 law). 
136 264 F.3d 201, 233 (2001). 
137 See id.   
138 See id.  
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job of protecting the interests of the class than the presumptive lead plaintiff; instead, the 
question is whether anyone can prove that the presumptive lead plaintiff will not have done a 
‘fair and adequate’ job.”139 It further stated that any fee request that was properly submitted 
pursuant to a retainer agreement enjoyed a presumption of reasonableness that could only be 
rebutted by a showing that the agreement was “clearly excessive.”140   
 Another case in which the court rejected competitive bidding after an exhaustive analysis 
was In re Microstrategy Inc. Sec. Litig.141 The court believed that auctioning of lead plaintiff 
positions was outside the scope of the PSLRA and the court was simply unauthorized to order 
such an auction.142 The court seemed to believe that existing mechanisms would ensure that the 
interests of the plaintiff class were adequately protected.143 In reaching this decision the court 
relied heavily on its ability to approve the selection of counsel and to ensure that the ultimate fee 
structure proposed by the attorneys was reasonable.144 
 Notably, the SEC filed an amicus brief arguing that the court’s approval of the lead 
plaintiff’s selection of counsel should be based on a Rule 23(a)(4) four-factor analysis.145 The 
factors which the courts historically have used include (1) the competence, experience and 
expertise of the counsel in handling a similar class action suit; (2) the financial resources, 
diligence and personal motivation of the attorney to advocate for the class; (3) the absence of any 
conflict of interest; (4) the appropriate number of counsel necessary to properly litigate the class 
                                                 
139 See id. See also, Burnside, supra note 135, at 380-82 (The author provides a detailed analysis of this holding).  
140 See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 233 (2001). 
141 110 F.Supp. 2d 427,437-38 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
142 Id. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. at 437-38 (“The ultimate fee structure is within a district court’s discretion throughout the litigation, because, 
at the conclusion of the litigation, a district court has a statutory obligation to ensure that the ultimate award of 
attorney’s fees is reasonable. Instead, a district court should approve plaintiff’s choice of lead counsel based solely 
on that counsel’s competence, experience, and resources, saving the question of fees until the conclusion of the 
litigation.”). 
145 See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants on the Issue 
Specified at 23, In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., Nos. 00-2769, 00-3653 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2000). 
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action without causing unnecessary disorganization or delay or increased costs.146  The SEC was 
concerned that auctioning of lead counsel positions would lead to decision-making based heavily 
on the projected costs, rather than the quality of the firms competing for the position.147  
 The ultimate goal of class action litigation is to maximize the benefit to the class 
members if the litigation proves successful.148 For opponents of auctions, this goal is best 
achieved by limiting the role of the court to determining the most appropriate lead plaintiff.149  
Once the court has been satisfied that the proper individual, group, or institution has been placed 
in that position, the court should adopt a “hands-off” approach, intervening only when it is clear 
that fees are unreasonable or that the counsel selected by the lead plaintiff is clearly 
inappropriate.150  Opponents of competitive bidding argue that this approach is the only way in 
which courts can be true to the legislative intent of the PSLRA.   
C. IT IS INAPPROPRIATE OF JUDGES TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF AUCTIONEER 
Judges are not “surrogate clients.”151 They are not motivated by the same set of factors 
that the client would be, nor do they have the same overall concerns.152  Judges may be 
motivated by self-interest, personal goals, and a simple desire to expedite the litigation to a quick 
settlement in order to clear up an over crowded docket.153  Overcrowded dockets may cause a 
court to inadvertently weigh price more heavily rather than delve into the subtle, yet distinctive, 
differences of various law firms competing for the position of lead plaintiff.154Additionally, 
evaluating what auction design is appropriate for a particular case is complex.  Properly 
                                                 
146 See Burnside, supra note 135, at 384.  
147 See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants on the Issue 
Specified at 18, In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., Nos. 00-2769, 00-3653 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2000). 
148 See Valle, supra note 31 at 372. 
149 See  Fisch, supra note 37 at 690. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
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designing an auction and administering it is something that could potentially involve a 
“substantial expenditure of judicial resources.”155 Judicial experience in conducting such 
auctions is limited, and due to the few cases that have actually utilized auctions, it is impossible 
to fairly evaluate whether judges have done an adequate job of conducting these auctions.156  
Another common criticism of auctions is that judges conducting them are too focused on 
the price of litigation, often sacrificing quality for a “cheaper” firm.157 The Third Circuit Task 
Force on the Selection of Class Counsel expressed this fear when it concluded that this focus on 
the bottom line price without giving sufficient weight to other factors creates a risk that the 
plaintiff class will be saddled with “low quality representation.”158  In order for judges to 
consider the quality of the firm, the judge would have to have access to a variety of information 
in order to consider non-price variables.159 Further complicating this analysis is the fact that as 
with many other areas of business, the price an attorney charges is often directly correlated to his 
or her quality.160  A number of cases offer some insight into the struggle that courts have had in 
attempting to evaluate the firm’s overall quality.  Although Judge Walker in Oracle attempted to 
evaluate the quality of the various firms submitting bids, the information that the firms provided 
was unhelpful in this determination.161 
Advocates of auctions argue that this concern is overstated.  As courts become more 
experienced at conducting auctions, they are beginning to request more information about the 
                                                 
155 See id. at 691. 
156 See Jill E. Fisch, Complex Litigation at the Millennium:  Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the 
Selection of Lead Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 53, 82 (2001). 
157 See Valle, supra note 31, at 374-75.  
158 See Third Circuit Task Force Report on the Selection of Class Counsel 45 (Jan. 2002), available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/final%20report%20of%20third%20circuit%20task%20force.pdf (last 
visited March 10, 2004). 
159 See Fisch, supra note 156 at 83. 
160 See id.  
161 See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 542 (N.D. Cal. 1990).  
 26
firms vying for the position of lead counsel.162 Information that judges have requested from firms 
include descriptions of qualifications, willingness to post bonds, demonstration that the firm has 
evaluated the case, malpractice coverage, all in addition to bid price and structure.163 The 
increased quality of information has allowed courts to better compare and contrast the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of each firms bid, thus making a more educated decision regarding 
who is best qualified to represent the plaintiff class.164 Judge Walker concluded that it was 
“impossible objectively to distinguish among these firms in terms of their background, 
experience and legal abilities.”165  
The court in Cendant claimed to take the quality of the firm into account when rendering 
its decision as to which firm would be awarded the position of lead plaintiff’s counsel.166 
However, its analysis of quality was primarily based on litigation experience to the exclusion of 
other relevant factors.167 Notably, the court did not consider the reputation of the firm, nor the 
quality of the investigation that the firm did in preparing its bid.  The Cendant court’s emphasis 
on the litigation experience of the firm it ultimately selected is interesting, particularly since 
most securities litigation cases do not go to trial. 
Still another approach was taken by the court in Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable 
Holdings, Inc.168 The court in Sherleigh attempted to structure auction bids to take qualitative 
factors such as the firm’s experience in securities litigation, its qualifications to complete the 
work, and the firm’s investigation of the case.169 But, the court did not explain how these factors 
                                                 
162 See Fisch, supra note 156 at 81. 
163 See id. 
164 See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 542 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
165 See id. 
166 See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 387, 390 (D.N.J. 2000). 
167 See id. (the Cendant court viewed litigation experience, fiscal ability, and the proposed fee scheduled as the most 
pertinent criteria in selecting lead counsel).  
168 186 F.R.D. 669, 671 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
169 See id. at 696. 
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would be considered and weighed in the final selection process.170 “If a court does not specify 
precisely which factors demonstrate firm quality, it can use quality factors to rationalize the 
selection of whichever firm it chooses.”171  
A completely different set of criteria were used by the court in Wenderhold v. Cylink.172 
The court threw out traditional factors—if such a word can be used to describe the competitive 
bidding process—when making its lead counsel determination.  Instead of relying on the various 
firm’s securities litigation experience, presence in the area, access to resources such as an office 
in the area, the court decided that the chosen firm’s smaller size gave it a greater incentive to 
succeed.173 “A court’s assessment of firm quality seems arbitrary when a firm’s small size or 
lack of litigation experience can be either a benefit or a detriment for purposes of quality 
evaluation.”174  
These cases illustrate the difficulty that various courts have had in making decisions 
regarding who should become lead plaintiff’s counsel.  Without any guidelines to follow, courts 
struggle to find their own definition of “quality.”  How quality is defined varies dramatically 
based on which judge in which district is hearing the case.  Importantly, these criteria never 
consider the “fit” of the firm to the lead plaintiff class representatives.175 In the optimal situation 
the firm selected by the court would be able to work cohesively with the lead plaintiff 
representatives.  However, if this is not the case, the entire litigation could suffer as a result of 
the poor relationship between the plaintiffs’ representatives and the lead counsel.   
                                                 
170 See Fisch, supra note 156, at 84 (surveying all the cases cited in this section). 
171 See id. 
172 191 F.R.D. 600 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
173 See id. at 602-03. 
174 See Fisch, supra note 156, at 84.  
175 See id. 
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Even if the court limits itself to selection of a firm based solely on the price of the bid, the 
ultimate price is not easy to determine.176 There are a variety of bid structures which must be 
evaluated, each with its inherent incentives.177 Additionally, bids have various “cross over” 
points, in which the bid appears to be the best bid until a certain point in the litigation is 
reached.178 Since courts are making the decision of lead plaintiff’s counsel at the beginning of 
the litigation, it is difficult to know how far the litigation will progress or whether it will settle 
prior to trial.179 Thus, the court may itself make an assessment of how far the case will progress 
and decide to choose a firm based on that assessment.  However, if that assessment is incorrect, 
the plaintiff class looses.  
 
D. SETTLING TOO QUICKLY; TOO CHEAPLY—AND OTHER SELF-SERVING BEHAVIOR 
There are several fee structures that have been used in auctions.  Each creates its own 
incentive problems.180 These most common fee structures include the “capped” fee structure, the 
declining percentage of fee recovery structure, fixed percentage structure, and the duration-based 
fee structure.181  
Under a capped fee structure, the lawyers receive a percentage which is limited to a certain 
amount.  Once that amount is achieved, the law firm will receive no additional monies regardless 
of the settlement actually achieved. This has the unfortunate effect of eliminating any “incentive 
beyond the point at which fees are capped.”182  This effect is illustrated in In re Bank One 
S’holders Class Actions.183  In this case, the court estimated that the recovery to the plaintiff 
                                                 
176 See id. at 85. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See Fisch, supra note 37 at 679-80. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. at 679. 
183 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
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class would be $4.6 to $4.8 billion.184 The court had previously rejected a bid by a firm that 
estimated recovery at $65 million, stating that such a low recovery “defies reality.”185 Yet the 
court subsequently approved a settlement of $45 million, an amount that was approximately one 
percent of the court’s own estimate of the worth of the case.186 Ironically, the settlement was 
proposed at precisely the point where plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees were capped.  Thus, it is at least 
open to discussion that the fee cap of $25 million negotiated by plaintiff’s attorneys had an 
impact on the decision to settle for one percent of the court’s valuation of the case.187  
The declining percentage bid structure contemplates a higher percentage initially, and a 
decreasing percentage after the settlement reaches certain defined amounts: 
Because it fails to align counsel’s interests with those of the plaintiff class at high 
levels of recovery, a declining percentage of recovery fee structure is especially 
likely to create a significant moral hazard problem.  The last dollars of a recovery 
are generally the most costly to produce, limiting counsel’s motivation to pursue 
them.  The incremental value to counsel of additional dollars recovered is 
particularly small when counsel will receive a very low percentage of those 
dollars….Thus, under typical litigation conditions, the declining percentage fee 
may produce a windfall return to counsel while, at the same time, shortchanging 
the plaintiff class.188 
 
Another type of fee structure is the duration-based fee structure. There are two variations of 
the duration-based fee structure.  The first is a simple calendar based contingency, the more 
common is a litigation stage contingency.  These contingencies create perverse incentives to 
delay litigation.  This becomes a particularly compelling issue when considering the fact that t is 
plaintiffs’ counsel who typically controls the duration of most litigation.189 Courts are generally 
                                                 
184 See id. at  788. 
185 See id. at 788 & n.11. 
186 See Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action and Settlement Hearing Thereon, Exhibit A to 
Preliminary Approval Order in Connection with Settlement Proceedings, In re Bank One S’holders Class Actions, 
No. 00-C-880 N.D. Ill. March 20, 2001); See also Fisch, supra note 185 at 668-670 & n.107-109 (describing Bank 
One estimate and settlement result).  
187 See Fisch, supra note 156 at 679. 
188 See id. at 678-79. 
189 See id. at 680. 
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unable to monitor the progress of litigation sufficiently to detect and appropriately sanction 
unnecessary delay resulting in a situation where the plaintiff class is paying for litigation that is 
not benefiting them, and in fact is detrimental to the class’ overall net recovery.190  A related 
problem is the incentives created by early-settlement bonuses.  “[E]arly settlement bonuses can 
give defendants additional leverage in negotiating a cheap settlement by creating a time-based 
discontinuity in the returns to effort of plaintiffs’ counsel.”191  
Opponents of auctions argue that the various incentives created by the fee structures 
commonly used in auctions negate any potential advantage they have in reducing the overall 
attorney awards.  Of the existing systems, the fixed percentage fee structure is the least 
problematic in creating agency incentives. The fixed percentage fee structure offers an easy, 
concrete way of evaluating competing bids while minimizing the importance of an accurate 
prediction of the litigation’s value.192  While auction opponents have a valid point with respect to 
fee structures when the auction involves the lead plaintiff position, these arguments dissipate 
when considering claims auctions. 
  
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION—AUCTIONS OF ENTIRE CLAIM USING PENALTIES 
TO SAFEGUARD THE CLAIM AGAINST OPPORTUNISTIC LOW BIDDING 
 
Claims auctions, defined as the auctioning of an entire claim to the litigating firm, which then 
owns the claim outright, offer a unique way of minimizing agency costs and addressing problems 
left by the PSLRA’s reliance on the lead plaintiff provision as well as problems that are created 
by lead plaintiff’s counsel auctions.  The PSLRA ‘s reliance on the lead plaintiff provision of the 
Act to safeguard the plaintiff class’ rights seems misplaced. Since the Act was enacted, there has 
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not been a noticeable trend in reduction of attorney fees.193 Furthermore, there is no evidence  
that lead plaintiffs are at all successful in negotiating fees downward.194  Finally, reliance on 
benchmarks to determine what the appropriate fee should be may not be reasonable.  These 
customary benchmarks were established pre-PSLRA and may constitute a “clearly unreasonable 
fee arrangement,” when it “was not the result of hard bargaining.”195 A recent article estimates 
that less than ten percent of lead plaintiffs actually engage in any bargaining at all with the lead 
counsel.196 
Additionally, the data suggests that even though courts have the authority to lower a 
benchmark rate when it is inappropriate, they rarely do so.197 The Third Circuit Task Force 
suggested that courts regularly lowered benchmark rates, yet could cite to only eighteen 
situations in which fees awarded to attorneys in non-auction situations were lower than the 
standard 25 to 30 percent.198 Given the prevalence of securities litigation—300 securities 
lawsuits were filed after the adoption of the PSLRA through December of 2001--eighteen 
instances out of 300 is not a very significant statistical percentage.199 An examination of the 
actual percentages awarded to attorneys further negates the argument that courts routinely lower 
benchmark awards that they deem to be inappropriately. There were 733 federal class action 
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securities class action fraud cases filed between January 1991 and May 1999.200 The average 
award given to the attorneys litigating these cases was 30.12 percent of the total settlement 
amount.201 The obvious conclusion is that the instances where a court has reduced a benchmark 
award have been so slight as to not disturb the average, thus, courts are not exercising this 
authority often.202 In other words, “downward departures from the benchmark are possible in 
theory but occur rarely in fact.”203  
Critics of a price comparison method argue that a lower fee award is not always in the best 
interests of the class if it causes the attorneys involved to devote less time and energy into 
litigating the case.  However, there “is an equally relevant and unassailable observation…higher 
fees are also not in the best interests of the class if they fail to optimize net recovery to class 
members.”204 
Conversely, critics of lead counsel auctions also raise compelling arguments why that 
method may be sub-optimal. Thus, the most advantageous approach may be the more radical 
approach of auctioning an entire claim to the firm.   
Securities litigation is one area of law that could legitimately be litigated in such a manner 
because the claims can be more accurately and objectively valued at least as compared to other 
types of mass tort regulation.205  For example, a securities class action claim could be evaluated 
by calculating the drop in the price of shares to determine the value of the entire lawsuit.  Unlike 
tort claims that involve many factual disputes and subjective issues regarding the extent of the 
injury and other uncertain elements, the stock market price in a securities litigation claim is 
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mostly ascertainable and is not open to debate.  As a result, teams of lawyers could readily 
evaluate the worth of the claim.   
Perhaps one of the most compelling advantages to such a system is the elimination of the 
agency incentives that exist in nearly all other forms of attorney compensation. Even the most 
virulent critics of the auction process concede that the auction process allows courts to avoid 
many problems traditionally associated with class counsel in mass securities actions.206 The sale 
of an entire claim “is the optimal method, in theory, to overcome the agency costs that result 
from the plaintiffs’ attorneys overlooking the interests of their class action clients.”207 The firm, 
having committed its financial resources to a claim has every incentive to litigate it fully and 
completely to recoup its initial investment.  The danger of undervaluing a claim could be 
countered by the imposition of a penalty should the amount recovered exceed the amount paid by 
a certain percentage.  That penalty in turn could be used to further compensate the plaintiff class. 
Auctioning a claim versus auctioning the position of lead counsel has the additional 
advantage of freeing the court from the responsibility of supervising the quality of bidders.208 
The court would no longer have to ponder whether the low bidder is able to win the auction 
“simply because he or she is a poor quality attorney who is willing to work for a low return.”209  
Such auctions also remove the concern that the firm involved will recommend a settlement 
agreement that is achieved quickly and cheaply to the detriment of the plaintiff class.210  Yet 
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another advantage of the claims auction system is that the court would no longer need to concern 
itself about which fee structure would best suit the litigation.  It would be freed from expending 
any resources evaluating which fee structure proposed by competing bidding firms is in the 
plaintiff class’ best interests.  It would simply choose the highest bidder and distribute the funds 
to the plaintiff class. Thus, an adoption of the claims auction system would eliminate the fears of 
cross-over costs in which the court, believing that the litigation would end at an earlier stage, 
mistakenly selects one bidder when another bidder would have ultimately proven to be more cost 
effective.  Additionally, concerns about the court remaining neutral and being the appropriate 
auctioneer are minimized in a claims auction system.  In this system, the judge is only choosing 
the highest price and is not personally invested in any subjective or objective analytical decision 
making which critics contend could unconsciously color the judge’s neutrality when the judge 
has selected a lead plaintiff based on a proposed fee structure.211 
 Another advantage that claims auctions would have is that it would allow other firms and 
lawyers into the currently oligopolistic market of securities fraud plaintiffs’ counsel.  Currently, 
an empirical study of shareholder class actions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1999 
and 2000 demonstrates that sixteen firms were involved in over 75% of all such class action 
suits. 212  When so few players dominate the mass securities litigation market, it can not be 
seriously debated that no true free marketplace exists.  Currently, only a selected few firms in the 
United States engage in mass securities litigation.  The behavior of these firms has been 
described as anti-competitive and even “cartel-like.”213  The existing system whereby only a few 
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firms participate in mass securities litigation is likely to be disadvantageous to plaintiffs.  
Because so few firms are able to participate, they have little—if any—incentive to be cost-
effective or to be responsive to the plaintiff class.   
Contrast this to the situation that would exist in a claims auction system where any firm 
that could finance the cost of the litigation would be able to participate, not just those firms with 
an established reputation in mass securities litigation. “The auction approach would tend to break 
down the existing, anticompetitive structure of plaintiffs’ class action securities litigation, in 
which a small number of firms appear in nearly every case and effectively dominate the 
litigation.”214 Opening up this legal arena to other firms will likely prove beneficial to the 
plaintiff class.  With the possibility of true competition and a real chance that established 
securities litigation firms may not get the majority of the business by simply showing up, these 
firms may have added incentives to appropriately evaluate claims, ensuring that the plaintiff 
class is adequately compensated and to ensure that their fees are appropriate for the complexity 
of a given case.   
 An additional advantage of a claims auction is to ensure that the plaintiff class receives 
compensation quickly, rather than after years of litigation proceedings.215  The plaintiff class is 
paid soon after the winning bidder places the money with the court and the court deducts 
appropriate costs.216 Many, if not most, plaintiffs would see this arrangement as advantageous.  
Once the plaintiff class is removed from the picture, the firm which now “owns” the claim, can 
litigate it fully, using all appropriate strategies to achieve the optimal outcome with little in the 
way of agency incentives.  
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 Much has been said about the potential concrete, measurable advantages that a properly 
administered claims auction system could provide.  However, there are also intrinsic advantages 
to such a system, that while not quantifiable, are significant in their own right.  First, the auction 
process could minimize the public’s opportunity to discredit plaintiff’s attorneys who are 
engaged in this type of litigation, which ultimately demeans the entire legal profession.217 
Second, and more importantly, a claims auction system would allow for a truly adversarial 
proceeding to go forward.  In a claims auction system, both sides have every incentive to engage 
in complete discovery of the claims, to investigate fully, to litigate aggressively and vigorously, 
and to object to settlement offers that are too low or that are premature.  In this situation, the 
court is able to hear and decide arguments that are presented on the merits, and are fine-tuned as 
a result of the parties’ adversity because neither side is inclined to simply settle quickly and walk 
away.  
 An additional potential intrinsic advantage to the auction approach is that “disappointed 
bidders are likely to be on the lookout for shortcomings in the performance of the winner” in 
order to successfully challenge that winner in the next auction and to make themselves a stronger 
competitor overall.218 Thus, with firm’s performance being evaluated by unsuccessful bidders, 
the litigating attorneys have additional incentives to apply themselves and to achieve the best 
possible outcome of the case.219 
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CONCLUSION 
 The PSLRA has not been as effective at curtailing abusive entrepreneurial behavior on 
the part of attorneys as it was initially hoped at its inception.  This is a result of a number of 
factors:  (1)  the failure of institutional investors to step forward and assume the role of lead 
plaintiffs; (2) the lack of meaningful judicial oversight and review of settlement agreements; and 
(3) the lack of true adversity between the plaintiffs’ attorney and the defendants so that a 
settlement truly reflects a hard-fought series of negotiations with the plaintiff class’ best interest 
in mind.  With both the plaintiffs’ attorney and the defendants eager to settle, neither has any 
incentive to object to a proposed settlement agreement.   
 Auctions of lead plaintiff positions are also not without significant problems.  The most 
commonly cited problems of lead plaintiff auctions include the inability of a judge to estimate 
appropriately which bid is the most cost-effective, the lack of meaningful measurements to 
determine the best firm or lawyer for the position, and improper agency incentives for attorneys. 
The most troubling of these aforementioned problems are inappropriate incentives for the 
attorneys involved to settle cases at too early a stage in the litigation, or to engage in “make-
work” knowing that any request for payment that falls within the standard benchmark rates of 
25-30% will likely be unquestioningly approved by the court.  Thus, lead plaintiff’s counsel 
auctions, while certainly innovative, have not altogether addressed the problems inherent in 
securities class action suits.  
 The most promising solution to the problem of opportunistic behavior on the part of 
attorneys to the detriment of the plaintiff class appears to be that of auctioning an entire claim to 
the highest bidder.  This solution removes many of the problems inherent in the lead plaintiff 
auction.  It appears particularly well-suited to the securities class action case because damages 
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are more objectively calculated then they are in other types of mass litigation such as mass torts.  
The fact that damages are more objectively evaluated helps ensure that the claim will not be 
undervalued excessively by bidders.  Including a “penalty” provision will also ensure that the 
plaintiff class does not receive less than what is truly owed them.  For example, if the ultimate 
recovery is more than 50% above that of the bid, a penalty could provide that a portion of those 
earnings is returned to the members of the plaintiff class.  Ownership of the entire claim also 
addresses the problem of improper agency incentives that benefit the lawyer at the disadvantage 
of the plaintiff class.   
 Additionally, ownership of the claim takes the guesswork out of the equation for the 
courts.  Under this system, a judge would not have to evaluate different bidding structures, 
attempt to estimate where in the proceedings a class action will end, and evaluate the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of competing counsel.  In this system, the highest bidder wins.   
 Finally, this structure also ensures that the plaintiff class is compensated efficiently for its 
losses.  Once court costs are calculated, the plaintiff class is immediately paid, and is effectively 
out of the litigation.  This is at least arguably better for the plaintiff class which under the current 
system could face years of uncertainty as the case progresses to trial.  
 Although no system would perfectly address all problems inherent in securities class 
action cases, the claims auction system appears to be the most comprehensive solution.  If 
properly conducted, it offers the promise of litigation that is the most beneficial to the real party 
in interest, which to the chagrin of some attorneys and some law firms, is actually the plaintiff 
class and not themselves.  
